University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
MPA/MPP/MPFM Capstone Projects

James W. Martin School of Public Policy and
Administration

2017

The Effects of Land Use Deregulations in the Capitol Region on
Gross Regional Domestic Product in South Korea
Youngchul Kim
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Land Use Law Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation
Commons, and the Urban, Community and Regional Planning Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Kim, Youngchul, "The Effects of Land Use Deregulations in the Capitol Region on Gross Regional
Domestic Product in South Korea" (2017). MPA/MPP/MPFM Capstone Projects. 274.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds/274

This Graduate Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by the James W. Martin School of
Public Policy and Administration at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in MPA/MPP/MPFM Capstone
Projects by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

The Effects of Land Use Deregulations in the Capitol Region on
Gross Regional Domestic Product in South Korea

Youngchul Kim. Student
Dr. Merl Hackbart. Advisor
MPP Capstone
Martin School of Public Policy and Administration
1

Table of Contents
Executive Summary ............................................................................................3
1. Introduction .................................................................................................4
2. Literature Review .........................................................................................5
3. Background ..................................................................................................8
Historical Development of the Growth Management Policy ...................................................... 8
Administrative Divisions of South Korea ................................................................................... 10
The Mitigation of the Capitol Region Regulation ...................................................................... 11

4. Research Methodology ...............................................................................13
Research Design ........................................................................................................................ 13
Data Collection ......................................................................................................................................15
Overview of the GRDP ..........................................................................................................................16

5. Analysis and Results ...................................................................................17
Checking Homoscedasticity of Residuals ...........................................................................................18
Checking Multicollinearity ...................................................................................................................18
Spurious Correlation by the Time Trend ............................................................................................19
The Results of the Regression Analysis ..............................................................................................21
Findings ...................................................................................................................................................22
Limitation ...............................................................................................................................................23

6. Conclusion..................................................................................................24
References .......................................................................................................25

2

Executive Summary

South Korea has implemented strong land use regulations controlling the growth of the
capitol region (Seoul, and around areas) in order to encourage balanced regional development
between the capitol area and the non-capitol area. However, there are ongoing debates about the
relationship between the regulatory policies and the balanced regional development.

The purpose of this study is to examine the extent of the effect that the land use
deregulation in the capitol region has on growth of both regions. To address this question, I use a
difference-in-differences model to empirically analyze how the land use deregulation in the
capitol region in 2008 has affected the economic growth of the capitol and non-capitol regions.

The results suggest that the deregulations in the capitol region have no significant effects
on the change of GRDP. In other words, the regulatory policy in the capitol region does not
promote balanced regional development because the deregulation does not restrict the economic
growth of the non-capitol region. Moreover, the GRDP has a high correlation with the factors
related to productivity such as economically active population and operating surplus. One
possible explanation for this result is that the difference of economic growth between regions
depends on the difference of productivity in each region. Therefore, Korea’s government needs
to consider policies that promote productivity of less developed regions to balance the regional
growth.
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1. Introduction
Many countries, both developing and developed, have adopted growth management
policies for a national development. Typically, growth management policies aim to constrain
excessive population growth and urban sprawl, which cause traffic congestion, air pollution, and
other urban problems (Cho, 2002). However, some countries adopt growth management policies
based on strong land use regulations to solve the problem of uneven regional development (Youn
and Kim, 2006). South Korea is an excellent example of a country implementing growth
management policies to prevent excessive concentration of population and industry as well as
balance regional development for several decades. In particular, South Korea has implemented
strong land use regulations controlling the growth of the capitol region (Seoul, and around areas)
in order to encourage balanced regional development between the capitol area and the noncapitol area rather than prevent urban ills resulting from overcrowding.
However, there are ongoing debates about the relationship between the regulatory
policies and the balanced regional development. Kim, E., and Kim, K.(2003) conclude that
although Korea’s central government has continuously attempted to introduce various policies to
diminish the economic inequality between the six largest developed cities and the other less
developed regions, there is no significant evidence that these regulatory policies have decreased
economic inequality. Rather, they find that income has been distributed more equally in the
largest developed cities than in other less developed regions for the same period. Kim and Lim
(2005) maintain that the regulatory policies in the capitol region do not have a positive effect on
balanced regional development. Also, they emphasize that negative effects should be taken more
seriously because the regulatory policies decrease national competitiveness. On the contrary,
Hong and Im (2015) assert that the gap between the capitol and non-capitol regions has been
4

reduced by the early 2000s. However, in 2008, land use deregulations in the capitol region
weakened the economic foundation of the non-capitol region (Hong and Im, 2015).
To my knowledge, there are a lot of studies that analyze how regulatory policies in the
capitol region affect economic growth of the capitol and non-capitol regions. However, there are
few studies that analyze how land use deregulations in the capitol region influence the economic
growth of the capitol and non-capitol regions. Therefore, in this paper I aim to examine the
extent of the effect that the land use deregulation in the capitol region has on growth of both
regions. To address this question, I use a difference-in-differences model to empirically analyze
how the land use deregulation in the capitol region in 2008 has affected the economic growth of
the capitol and non-capitol regions. My analysis will help to resolve controversy about the
capitol region regulations, which are the backbone of South Korea’s growth management
policies.

2. Literature Review
In the U.S, since the 1970s many local governments have adopted growth management
policies to prevent urban problems like pollution and congestion. After the 2000s, many scholars
have carried out studies to evaluate effects of these growth management policies.
Nelson and Peterman (2000) empirically analyze economic effects of growth
management policies by comparing “the relative share of total personal income in the U.S” (p.
281) between the metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with growth management programs and
those without the growth management programs. They use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression model defining “the dependent variable as the change in the relative share of total
personal income” (p. 281), and the experimental variable as the growth management programs.
5

Their findings show that the growth management programs have a positive influence on the
economic performance of local governments.
On the other hand, Saks (2008) and Ogura (2010) maintain that growth management
policies restrain the sustained growth of regions that are influenced by those policies. By using
simple regression models with fixed effects, Saks examines how land use restrictions influence
labor markets in MSAs. This study suggests the land use restrictions have a detrimental effect on
the labor markets in MSAs. In particular, these restrictions decrease housing supply, which in
turn leads to an upsurge in housing prices. Consequently, the land use restrictions drive workers
out of the cities because the workers cannot meet the housing prices in the cities. For this reason,
the growth of the labor market is lower in regions with land use restrictions.
Likewise, Ogura’s study illustrates the relationship between urban growth controls
(UGC) and intercity commuting. To evaluate this relationship, the author applies a gravity model
to figure out the flow of intercity commuting in California. Ogura uses an OLS regression to
estimate the gravity model. The results suggest that the UGC move workers to the outer areas of
a city. The moving of the workers makes commuting time longer and more costly, hence
residential development in the city is restricted because “UGC are typically imposed by local
jurisdictions without considering the location of workers and firms in nearby places” (p. 2187).
From an Economic perspective, Nandwa and Ogura (2013) assess the effect of urban
growth controls on regional production by using utility functions based on Brueckner’s (1999)
growth control model. Nandwa and Ogura reveal that “with strong agglomeration economies in
production, local governments tend to over-restrict population growth, thus leading to
inefficiently low production growth” (p. 669).
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To sum up, local governments, not a central government, adopt growth management
policies or urban growth controls in the U.S. Therefore, the purpose of growth management is to
entirely prevent urban problems that the residents of areas controlled by local governments are
facing. For these reasons, most research dealing with these subjects tends to focus on how the
growth management or controls have effects on those regions that adopt the growth management
or controls. On the contrary, most studies in South Korea deal with the effects of the growth
management policies on balanced development between the developed regions and less
developed regions. This is because growth management policies in South Korea aim to support
the growth of other less developed regions by restricting the growth of more developed regions.
Particularly, the regulations for growth control over the capitol region are the most controversial
issue in South Korea.
The study of Lee and Song (2011) advocate that the regulations in the capitol region are
necessary to balanced regional development. The authors examine “correlation between the
centralization of the capitol region and the regional disparity” (p. 373). For this analysis, they
conduct a canonical correlation analysis instead of regression because the theoretical base for
causality between the centralization of the capitol region and the regional disparity is yet to be
established in academia. The findings of this analysis demonstrate that the high centralization of
the capitol region makes the regional disparity worse.
Similarly, Hong and Im’s study (2015) emphasize that deregulations of industrial site
volume control in the capitol region decrease new construction of factories and firms in the noncapitol region. This study estimates the effects of the deregulations in the capitol region using the
Tobit model and OLS regression by the Difference-in-Differences estimator. The results show
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that the deregulations lead to new establishments of factories and firms in the capitol region
more than in non-capitol region by 1.5 times.
On the other hand, Kim and Lee (2009) empirically examine the effects of the capitol
region regulations on the productivity of the non-capitol region. For this analysis, they estimate a
production function by the Pooling OLS using the data from the Mining and Manufacturing
Survey. The results indicate that the current regulations over the capitol region do not help to
improve the development of the non-capitol region and rather reduce national productivity
because these regulations do not take into consideration the properties and differences (such as
geographical conditions and industrial characteristics) of each region.
Also, Youn and Kim (2006) research how the regulations in the capitol region affect the
change of regional productivity. They use the Cobb-Douglas production function to estimate
regional productivity and apply panel data analysis to calculate the regulation effects on the
regional productivity. The analysis of this paper suggests that the regulations in the capitol
region decrease productivity and weaken competitiveness of the capitol region. Furthermore,
there is no significant improvement of the non-capitol region after the capitol region regulations.
As we have seen above, even now a variety of scholars and economists are having
ceaselessly vigorous debates on the effects of the growth management policies in the capitol
region.

3. Background
Historical Development of the Growth Management Policy
In the 1960s, the purpose of the national development in Korea was to reconstruct an
economic base that had been destroyed by the Korean War. To establish the economic base,
8

Korea’s government first concentrated on the promotion programs of six strategic cities (Seoul,
Pusan, Taegu, Inchon, Daejeon, and Gwangju), which were selected as growth poles. These
growth management policies were very successful in rapidly increasing the national growth;
however, as graph 1 shows, they also gave rise to excessive population concentration in the
capitol region as well as serious social inequality such as an asymmetry between regions (Kim,
2003).
Graph 1. Population 1970~2014
Thousand population

Note. The growth management policies lead to population concentration into the capitol region. Source : The
Statistics Korea.

For these reasons, during the 1970s the Korean government shifted the aim of the
growth management policies from fueling the national growth to supporting balanced regional
growth. The changed growth management policies focused on preventing enlargement and
centralization of metropolitan areas, especially the capitol region (Seoul, Inchon and Gyeonggi),
so that less developed regions can catch up with the developed regions. In particular, in 1982
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Korean government enacted the Capitol Region Readjustment Planning Act (CRRPA), which
was based on strong regulations of land use. The core purpose of the CRRPA is to restrict
facilities (factories, universities, etc.) enticing population and money (OECD, 2009). Under the
CRRPA, the capitol region has been classified into three different districts: Overpopulated
Constraint District 1 , Growth Management District 2 , and Nature Conservation District 3 .
According to the classification, The Korean government has allocated the quota on the new
construction of industrial facilities and buildings and limited the expansion of existing factories
and academic institutions. Since then, the Korean government has adhered to the strong land use
regulations in the capitol region.

Administrative Divisions of South Korea
As table 1 shows, South Korea consists of 1 special city, 1 special autonomous city, 6
metropolitan cities, 8 provinces (formally called “Do”), and 1 special self-governing province.
These are subdivided into 227 lower level local governments. The capitol region includes three
different administrative divisions: Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeonggi-do. It is the center of economy,
business, industry, and culture in South Korea.
Table 1. Administrative Divisions of South Korea

Division

Name

Area
(㎢)

Population
(Million)

Note

Special city4

Seoul

605

10.20

The capitol region

Special autonomous
city5

Sejong

465

0.11

1 Districts where dispersion of population or factories into other districts is needed due to the excessive concentrate of
population and industry
2 Districts where growth management is needed for sustained growth
3 Districts where development is restricted for the natural environment conservation
4 The capital city of South Korea

10

Busan

770

3.54

Daegu

884

2.51

Daejeon

540

1.52

Gwangju

501

1.47

Incheon

1041

2.84

Ulsan

1060

1.15

Gyeonggi-do

10171

12.10

Gangwon-do

16874

1.54

Chungcheongbuk-do

7406

1.57

Chungcheongnam-do

8204

2.10

Gyeongsangbuk-do

19029

2.70

Gyeongsangnam-do

10535

3.32

Jeollabuk-do

8067

1.91

Jeollanam-do

12267

1.91

Jeju-do

1849

0.58

Metropolitan cities6
The capitol region

The capitol region

Provinces7

Special self-governing
province8

Note. South Korea consists of 1 special city, 1 special autonomous city, 6 metropolitan cities, 8 provinces, and 1
special self-governing province. Source : http://www.korea.net/Government/Constitution-and-Government/LocalGovernments.

The Mitigation of the Capitol Region Regulation
In 2008, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT) mitigated or abolished
considerable regulations limiting new industrial establishments and the expansion of existing
industrial facilities in the capitol region by “the Effective Management of Land Use for
Enhancing National Competitiveness”. In particular, this act allowed development, expansion,

5 The administrative capital city of South Korea
6 The first-level administrative divisions in South Korea, metropolitan cities have the equal rank to the provinces
7 The first-level administrative divisions in South Korea, provinces have the equal rank to the metropolitan cities
8 The province with more autonomous rights over its economy
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and relocation of firms and factories in industrial complexes of the capitol region, regardless of
size or category of industry. Also, the act permitted existing factories of the high-tech industry
outside industrial complexes to expand their size. In other words, the Korea’s government allows
almost all establishment and expansion of industrial facilities in the capitol region, regardless of
the size of factory and category of industry. This deregulation has been one of the drastic
changes in the regulatory policies because there was rare permission for any new construction or
expansion before 2008, except for only 8 categories in the high-tech industry (BYUN et al.,
2011). Table 2 shows the summary for the mitigation of industry regulations.
Table 2. The Mitigation of the Capitol Region Regulation for industry

The type of
district

Firm
size

The type of
zoning

Pre-deregulation

Post-deregulation

Prohibition
Prohibition
-Exception: Expansion of
high-tech industry within
1000m2
Prohibition
-Exception: Expansion of
high-tech industry within
1000m2

Permission
Prohibition
-Exception: Expansion of
high-tech industry within
200%
Prohibition
-Exception: Expansion of
high-tech industry within
100%

Small and medium-sized firm

Permission

Permission

Industrial complex

Prohibition

Permission

Industrial complex

Overpopulated
constraint
district

Largesized
firm

Industrial
zone
Other
Other

Growth
management
district

Largesized
firm

Industrial
zone
Other
Other

Small and medium-sized firm

Prohibition
-Exception: Expansion
within 3000m2
Relocation(8 categories)
Prohibition
-Exception: Expansion of
high-tech industry within
100%
Permission

Permission
All categories
Permission
Permission

Note. The Korea’s government allows all establishment and expansion of industrial facilities in the capitol region.
Source : Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (2008).
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4. Research Methodology
Research Design
To estimate the effect that the deregulation of the capitol region has on the economic
growth of the capitol and non-capitol region, this study uses a difference-in-differences (DID)
model. Typically, the DID model is utilized to evaluate the effects of public policies. The
treatment effect in Figure 1 indicates the net effect of a public policy, after general effects like
time trend and business cycles are eliminated. In particular, one can find the treatment effect by
calculating the difference in the average change before and after the policy was applied to the
treatment group (one group affected by a policy) and the control group (not affected by the
policy).
Figure 1. The difference-in-differences estimator of the treatment effect

- yi : The outcome of individual i
- θ0 : The non-receipt of treatment, θ1 : The receipt of treatment
- t0 : Pre-treatment period, t1 : Post-treatment period
t0

t1

Control group (λ0)

θ0

θ0

Treatment group (λ1)

θ0

θ1

Treatment effect

(E[yt1 |λ1, θ1] − E[yt0 |λ1, θ0]) − (E[yt1 |λ0, θ0] − E[yt0 |λ0, θ0])

Note. The treatment effect is the difference in the average change before and after the policy was applied to the
treatment group and the control group. Source: Blundell, R., Brewer, M. & Shephard, A. (2005).

This paper uses the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with the DID estimator to
measure the policy effect, which is the result of deregulation in the capitol region. The equation
is presented as follows. The treatment group is the capitol region because the regulatory policies
have been applied for the capitol region. Also, I denote the period after the deregulation in the
capitol region as Time=1 and the period before this as Time=0.
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Yi,t = β0 + β1Treat + β2Time + β3(Treat × Time) + β4Control + ε
- Yi,t : The outcome of Region i in year t
- Treat : The dummy variable indicating the statue of treatment (Non-treat = 0, Treat = 1)
- Time : The dummy variable indicating time period (Pre = 0, Post = 1)
- Treat × Time : The policy effect
- Control : The general socio-economic variables affecting the outcome
Figure 2. The regression equation for the difference-in-differences model
Note. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with the DID estimator to measure the policy effect, which is
deregulation effects in the capitol region.

The dependent variable for this regression model is the Gross Regional Domestic
Product (GRDP) of each region (i). The improvement of the GRDP in the non-capitol region is
one of the most important goals of the capitol region regulations (Youn and Kim, 2006).
Therefore, comparing the change of the GRDP between the capitol and non-capitol region is a
reasonable method of examining the policy effect of the deregulations over the capitol region.
With regard to independent variables, the model includes dummy variables for a treatment group
(The capitol region = 1, the non-capitol region = 0) and for time period (before 2008 & 2008 = 0,
after 2008 = 1), and an interaction term indicating the policy effect caused by the deregulation.
Also, my study includes control variables affecting the GRDP with reference to the related
literature. The description of variables is presented in Table 3.
Table 3. The description of variables

Variable
Dependent variable

GRDP

Independent variable

Treatment group

14

Measurement
Korean Won in billions
(at constant 2010 prices)
Non-capitol region = 0
Capitol region = 1

Policy effect

before 2008 & 2008 = 0
after 2008 = 1
Treat × Time

Operating surplus 9

Korean Won in billions

Economically active pop 10

Number in thousands

Recession11

2008 ~ 2009 = 1
Others = 0

Gender Rate

Percentage of male

College Grad Rate

Percentage

Time

Control
variable

Economic
factor

Social
factor

Note. This analysis includes independent variables to estimate policy effects and control variables to estimate
general effects.

Data Collection
This study utilizes data sets extracted from Korean national statistics during 2000 - 2014.
Since the capitol region regulations were mitigated in 2008, the time period of the data sets
would be suitable for analyzing the change before and after the deregulation. The variables of
“GRDP” and “operating surplus” are from Regional Account; the variables of “gender rate” and
“college grad rate” are from Population Census; and the variable of “economically active pop” is
from Economically Active Population Survey.
Summary statistics, divided into two groups of the capitol and non-capitol region, are
presented in Table 4. As evidenced by the table, the average values of all economic indicators in
the capitol region are much higher than those in the non-capitol region.
Table 4. Summary Statistics

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

38192

314160

The capitol region (Treatment group)
GRDP (Billion Won)

45

182831

100651

9 The proxy variable of capital stock to estimate impact of capital input (Youn & Kim, 2006)
10 The variable to estimate impact of labor input (Youn & Kim, 2006)
11 The variable to estimate impact of global financial crisis of 2008–09
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Operating Surplus (Billion Won)

45

63272

45374

6639

145996

Economically Active Pop (Thousand Pop)

45

3964

1930

1163

6442

College Grad Rate

45

36.75

8.14

20.29

53.25

Gender Rate

45

59.37

1.53

55.76

61.48

The non-capitol region (Control group)
GRDP

195

44770

22118

7612

102835

Operating Surplus

195

8101

4640

1768

22935

Economically Active Pop

195

944

402

268

1773

College Grad Rate

195

30.93

8.60

14.20

49.34

Gender Rate

195

57.87

2.39

52.16

66.67

Other dummy variables: Treatment group, Time period, Policy effect, Recession
Total observations: 240 on 16 Provinces and cities, Year : 2000 ~ 2014
Note. Summary statistics, which is divided into two groups of the capitol and non-capitol region.

Overview of the GRDP
Most of all, the essential assumption for the DID model is that the GRDP in the capitol
region (treatment group) and the non-capitol region (control group) would have the same trends
in the absence of the policy change (Gruber, 2013). If one group shows a different trend from the
other group in the absence of the policy change, the estimate of the DID model will be distorted.
Therefore, it is necessary to monitor trends of the GRDP of both regions before the policy
change. In Graph 2, both regions have steadily increased their GRDP with similar pace from
2000 to 2008; thus, we can assume the GRDP follows the same trend in the absence of the policy
change. Table 5 shows the average annual increasing rate of GRDP of both the capitol and noncapitol region. For the time period from 2000 to 2008, the capitol region had 0.46% higher
increasing rate than the non-capitol region. However, after 2008, the capitol region has
maintained the same rate as the non-capitol region.
To sum up, the deregulations in the capitol region did not encourage the economic
growth of the capitol region; at the same time, the deregulations did not hamper the economic
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development of the non-capitol region. To analyze accurately this explanation, this paper
conducts the OLS regression with the DID estimator in next section.
Graph 2. The yearly GRDP of each region

Billion Won

Note. Both regions have steadily increased their GRDP with similar pace from 2000 to 2008.
Table 5. The average annual increasing rate of GRDP

Total

2000~2008

2009~2014

Capitol region

3.78%

4.19%

3.05%

Non-capitol region

3.50%

3.73%

3.05%

Note. the capitol region has maintained the same rate as the non-capitol region after the deregulations.

5. Analysis and Results
Before I do the OLS regression analysis, I have to verify if the data support the
assumption about OLS regression because the wrong data can lead to incorrect results of the
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analysis. For this purpose, I check the homoscedasticity of residuals and multicollinearity among
the independent variables.

Checking Homoscedasticity of Residuals
Homoscedasticity of residuals is one of the most critical assumptions for the OLS
regression. The homoscedasticity means that the variance of residuals is constant across the
variables (Hansen, 2016). If the residuals do not have constant variance (Heteroscedasticity), it is
a common solution to use OLS regression with a “robust” option of Stata. In this paper, I do the
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test to check whether or not the variance of the residuals is
homogenous. As we can see from Table 6, since the P-value is very small, the hypothesis that the
residuals have constant variance is to be rejected. Therefore, we can see that the variance of the
residuals shows the heteroscedasticity.
Table 6. The result of Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test

Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of GRDP
chi2(1) = 8.21

Prob > chi2 = 0.0042

Note. The hypothesis that the residuals have constant variance is to be rejected.

Checking Multicollinearity
The multicollinearity means the situation in which two or more of the variables are
highly correlated (Hansen, 2016). When the multicollinearity exists, it makes the standard errors
greater and estimates of the coefficients unstable and sensitive. As a result, in the presence of the
multicollinearity, it will be difficult for the null hypothesis to be rejected.
I use the VIF (variance inflation factor) to detect the multicollinearity. Typically, when
the VIF value is higher than 10 or the tolerance value(1/VIF) is lower than 0.1 there is high
18

multicollinearity. The result of the VIF test indicates the variables have no values of 10 or above.
Although all variables remain under 10 point, “Economically Active Pop” and “Operating
Surplus”, with quite high VIF values, might be considered as factors to lead to the incorrect
result of the regression analysis. However, it is common that variables are highly correlated in
time series, but their changes are not strongly correlated (the correlation by the time trend is to be
dealt with in next section). Therefore, there is no problem with the multicollinearity here.
Table 7. The result of VIF

Variable

VIF

1/VIF

Economically Active Pop

8.22

0.121678

Operating Surplus

7.57

0.132168

treat

3.43

0.291964

Policy effect

2.04

0.490289

College Grad Rate

1.66

0.60287

time

1.61

0.621736

Gender Rate

1.14

0.87538

recession

1.02

0.982091

Mean VIF

3.33

Note. The result of the VIF test indicates the variables have no values of 10 or above.

Spurious Correlation by the Time Trend
As Table 8 shows, this regression demonstrates spurious correlation owing to the time
trend and should not be reported in the results. In the presence of time trends, all variables
predict each other regardless of whether they actually have any economic or policy relationship
at all. This is called spurious regression meaning regression only through growth, not through
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any real relationship. This regression shows that GRDP grows over time. The solution is to apply
the first differencing operator 12 to this model.
Table 8. The result of the robust regression including GRDP, year, and intersection variables

Variable

Coefficient

Std. Err.

t

P>t

Year

1329.808

474.8115

2.8

0.006

Chungcheongbuk-do

-2376.94

278.0066

-8.55

0.000

Chungcheongnam-do

1613.592

183.1512

8.81

0.000

Daegu

-2399.93

211.0092

-11.37

0.000

Daejeon

-3528.38

283.1932

-12.46

0.000

Gangwon-do

-3211.2

261.4519

-12.28

0.000

Gwangju

-3652.92

304.503

-12

0.000

Gyeonggi-do

18528.04

750.9582

24.67

0.000

Gyeongsangbuk-do

1380.135

53.37959

25.86

0.000

Gyeongsangnnam-do

1854.846

70.32829

26.37

0.000

Incheon

-549.389

101.1032

-5.43

0.000

Jeju-do

-5066.22

400.4521

-12.65

0.000

Jeollabuk-do

-2684.78

222.8736

-12.05

0.000

Jeollanam-do

-557.047

74.87295

-7.44

0.000

Seoul

21417.03

1549.112

13.83

0.000

Ulsan

-9.07419

50.8653

-0.18

0.859

_cons

49638.94

4897.81

10.13

0.000

Intersection (Provinces and cities ×Year)

Number of obs =
240
F( 16, 223) = 222.97
Prob > F
= 0.0000
R-squared
= 0.8907
Note. This regression shows spurious correlation owing to the time trend and should not be reported in the results.

12 “The dth differencing operator applied to a time series x is to create a new series z whose value at time t is the difference
between x(t + d) and x(t). This method works very well in removing trends and cycles.” (Newton (1999), Slide 4).
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The Results of the Regression Analysis
Since the variance of the residuals of the data shows the heteroscedasticity, I run a robust
regression using Stata (statistical software). Of course, all variables will be in change form,
including dummy variables, to solve the problem of the spurious regression.
Table 9 shows the result of the first-difference regression. According to the regression
results, the “Policy effect” variable, which interprets the effect on the deregulation in the capitol
region, is not statistically significant. In terms of the control variables, all variables but “College
grad rate” are statistically significant Indicators of the GRDP at the 5% level.
The prime purpose of the analysis is to evaluate the effect of the deregulation in the
capitol region using the treatment variables. The interpretation of the treatment variables is
central to this regression model. First, the variable “Treat” is significant (Coefficient = 2529.62,
P-value = 0.001). The variable “Treat”, which refers to just the capitol region, can be included to
show that when other variables are equal the capitol region grows faster. Second, the “Time”
variable is also statistically significant (Coefficient = -1246.82, P-value = 0.002). It indicates that
first differenced GRDP has considerably decreased after 2008. Lastly, the “Policy effect”
variable, which shows the difference-in-differences estimator on the mitigation of the capitol
region regulations, is not statistically significant (Coefficient = -2284.12, P-value = 0.187). it
means that when the regulations of the capitol region are mitigated, GRDP does not experience
any significant change. In other words, there is no correlation between the deregulation and the
economic growth of the capitol region as well as the non-capitol region. Also, regardless of the
statistical significance of the “Policy effect” coefficient, we cannot suggest that the deregulation
policy has a negative effect on the GRDP of the non-capitol region since the coefficient has
negative values.
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In terms of control variables, “Economically active pop”, “Operating Surplus”, and
“Gender Rate” have a positive effect on “GRDP”. In other words, factors related to productivity
contribute to the growth of GRDP. Variable “Recession”, which is included to estimate sudden
changes occurring in time-specific trends, has a negative effect on GRDP. It means that the
global financial crisis of 2008–09 led to downturn in economic activity in South Korea.
Table 9. The result of the robust regression with differenced variables

Variable

Coefficient

Std. Err.

t

P>t

Economically Active Pop D1.

37.86898

7.323061

5.17

0.000

Operating Surplus D1.

0.257767

0.114129

2.26

0.025

College Grad Rate D1.

-14.2368

118.557

-0.12

0.905

Gender Rate D1.

431.0187

207.2858

2.08

0.039

Recession D1.

-967.5

418.077

-2.31

0.022

Treat

2529.62

775.7482

3.26

0.001

Time D1.

-1246.82

392.2069

-3.18

0.002

Policy effect D1.

-2284.12

1727.376

-1.32

0.187

Cons

1339.878

207.225

6.47

0.000
Number of obs =
224
F( 8, 215) = 15.72
Prob > F
= 0.0000
R-squared
= 0.6488

Note. According to the regression results, the “Policy effect” variable, which interprets the effect on the deregulation
of the capitol region, is not statistically significant.

Findings
This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between the GRDP of each region and
the deregulation in the capitol region using OLS regression with the difference-in-differences
estimator. Consequently, the results of the regression model do not demonstrate any statistically
significant relationship between the GRDP of each region and the deregulation in the capitol
region. In other words, this analysis does not (at least statistically) provide any evidence to
support assertions that the mitigation of the regulations in the capitol region hindered the
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economic growth of the non-capitol region or gave an unfair advantage to the capitol region.
These findings are somewhat consistent with the results found by Youn and Kim (2006) in their
empirical analysis. Both this paper and Youn and Kim’s paper (2006) investigate the effect of the
capitol region regulations by estimating the change of the GRDP. The results of the analysis
point out that the effects are insignificant to the GRDP, an indicator showing regional economic
development.

Limitation
For more cohesive results, this study might need a larger number of samples, including
data of lower-level local governments. However, since the Korean National Statistical Office
does not provide the data of lower level for GRDP, I cannot include sufficient data numbers.
Moreover, a further analysis needs to consider not only GRDP but also other economic factors
such as the change of income or employment rate as the dependent variable. Various studies
produce a variety of alternative explanations on the effect of deregulations in the capitol region.
Therefore, the additional dependent variables and sufficient data, including lower-level local
government, can strengthen the reliability of the analysis on the effect of deregulations in the
capitol region.
In addition, the DID estimate assumes that there is no sudden impact affecting the
outcome in the presence of a policy change. However, since it is impossible to include all
variables to control for all possible sudden impact, the outcome would be biased due to
unobserved variables. This problem is also likely to be solved by increasing the number of
observations and implementing long-term study.
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6. Conclusion
This paper investigates the effects of deregulation in the capitol region on GRDP in
South Korea by using OLS regression analysis with the DID estimator. Since the deregulation in
the capitol region happened in 2008, this study includes the time period between 2000 and 2014.
The main purpose of this paper is to address the question about whether or not the regulation in
the capitol region supports balanced regional development by examining the extent of effect that
the deregulation has on the economic growth in the capitol and non-capitol region.
The results suggest that the deregulations in the capitol region have no significant effects
on the change of GRDP. In other words, the regulatory policy in the capitol region does not
promote balanced regional development because the deregulation does not restrict the economic
growth of the non-capitol region. Moreover, as we have seen from the results of the analysis, the
GRDP has a high correlation with the factors related to productivity such as economically active
population and operating surplus. Therefore, one possible explanation for this result is that the
difference of economic growth between regions depends on the difference of productivity in
each region, instead of the presence of regulations. This explanation supports Seo (2001) and
Park et al. (2004)’s contentions that high growth rate of the capitol region results from higher
total factor productivity in the capitol region than other regions. In this regard, Korea’s
government needs to consider policies that promote productivity of less developed regions to
balance the regional growth.
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